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ESSAY 
Joseph Pileri  
Uncharted Waters? Legal Ethics and the 
Benefit Corporation 
Abstract.  Corporate law norms are reflected in lawyers’ ethical duties.  
The enactment of benefit corporation legislation across the country signals a 
legislative acknowledgment that corporate law can serve as a public, rather 
than a merely private, ordering mechanism.  Benefit corporations expressly 
adopt a public benefit as a legal purpose of the enterprise.  While many have 
written about this important development with respect to corporate fiduciary 
law, this essay is the first to explore the professional and ethical responsibility 
of lawyers representing benefit corporations.  In the last century, as scholars 
and courts drove an understanding of corporate law that elevated the interests 
of shareholders above all other corporate constituents, the legal profession 
moved away from a model of public professionalism and embraced the ideal 
of the zealous advocate as a response.  As a result of benefit corporation 
legislation, I suggest a return to an ethical model in which attorneys 
representing these entities explicitly acknowledge that they owe duties that 
extend to non-shareholder stakeholders and the public.  
Author.  Supervising Attorney and Clinical Teaching Fellow, Georgetown 
University Law Center Social Enterprise & Nonprofit Law Clinic.  The author 
would like to thank Alicia Plerhoples, Lauren Rogal, Patience Crowder, Kevin 
Fitzgerald, and attendees at the American Association of Law Schools 2017 
Conference on Clinical Legal Education Works-in-Progress session. 
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As a distinct corporate form, the benefit corporation is now seven years 
old.1  Since the passage of the first authorizing statute in Maryland,2 thirty-
one states have enacted benefit corporation legislation.3  Despite a fair bit 
of pessimism,4 businesses are increasingly opting into this form.5  
Household names, like Patagonia6 and Kickstarter,7 have incorporated as 
 
1. See, e.g., Jennifer Dasari et al., Recognizing Social Entrepreneurship: Minnesota Embraces the Public 
Benefit Corporation, BENCH & B. MINN., Sept. 2014, at 19, 19 (indicating the country’s first benefit 
corporation statute passed in Maryland in 2010).  
2. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5–6C–01 (West 2017) (defining benefit corporations 
with an effective date of October 1, 2010); see also Gene Tagaki, Maryland’s Benefit Corporation, 
NONPROFIT L. BLOG (May 26, 2010), http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com/marylands-benefit-
corporation/ [https://perma.cc/5KDV-KVBM] (announcing Maryland was the first state to 
recognize the benefit corporation on April 13, 2010). 
3. See, e.g., Carol Liao, A Critical Canadian Perspective on the Benefit Corporation, 40 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 683, 689 (2017) (noting Maryland and Vermont have both established benefit corporations and 
that “[t]wenty-nine states have since followed suit with various forms of the benefit 
corporation . . . ”).  
4. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations––A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 591, 593, 610–14 (2011) (arguing benefit corporations lack accountability measures 
to enforce a for-profit agenda and pursue a general public benefit at the same time, otherwise known 
as the dual mission); Justin Blount & Kwabena Offei-Danso, The Benefit Corporation: A Questionable 
Solution to a Non-Existent Problem, 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 617, 659 (2013) (disputing the benefit 
corporation’s ability to promote the idea of corporate social responsibility and alleging its structure 
creates a false dichotomy between benefit corporations and business corporations that is practically 
unworkable); J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit Corporations Address 
Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for Change, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85, 105 (2012) 
(claiming the benefit corporation form is based on a flawed premise of shareholder primacy); Kennan 
Khatib, The Harms of the Benefit Corporation, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 188–89 (2015) (disapproving of 
benefit corporation legislation, and arguing the benefit corporation form is subject to abuse under 
ineffective enforcement and compliance regimes). 
5. Ellen Berrey, How Many Benefit Corporations Are There? (May 5, 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2602781 [https://perma.cc/Q9KH-SU6G] 
(finding 2,541 benefit corporations as of 2015); see also J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law 
Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 588 (2016) (noting 2,636 entities organized as benefit corporations or 
benefit LLCs as of 2016).  See generally Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days 
Out: Who’s Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 259–75 (2014) (describing Delaware companies 
incorporating or converting to benefit corporations). 
6. PATAGONIA WORKS, ANNUAL BENEFIT CORPORATION REPORT 5 (2013), 
http://www.patagonia.com/on/demandware.static/Sites-patagonia-us-Site/Library-Sites-
PatagoniaShared/en_US/PDF-US/bcorp_annual_report_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CJ8-Q2H9] 
(“Patagonia Works . . . and its sister companies . . . became benefit corporations on January 3, 2012, 
the first day we could legally do so in our home state of California.”). 
7. Yancey Strickler et al., Kickstarter Is Now a Benefit Corporation, KICKSTARTER: KICKSTARTER 
BLOG (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/kickstarter-is-now-a-benefit-corporation 
[https://perma.cc/23PQ-3XFG] (“We’re now Kickstarter PBC––a Public Benefit Corporation.”). 
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benefit corporations.  The first benefit corporation to go public held an 
initial public offering in February 2017.8  Many speak of a growing social 
enterprise movement, aided in part by dual bottom line entities like the 
benefit corporation that seeks to marry profit-seeking activities with a 
public good.9  While its ultimate success is by no means guaranteed, the 
benefit corporation is here to stay.  As a profession, attorneys should be 
questioning how to represent these entities. 
One major aspect of the benefit corporation form is a change to the 
obligations and protections of corporate fiduciaries, relative to traditional 
notions of the duties directors of a corporation owe and to whom.10  
Authorizing statutes require directors to consider the impact of corporate 
action on stakeholders other than shareholders, including the public, and 
they provide immunity to directors who consider all interested parties 
when making decisions.11  Though there has not been any caselaw 
interpreting director duties under these statutes, much has been written 
about the implications of this change in fiduciary law from traditional 
 
8. See, e.g., Lauren Gensler, The World’s Biggest For-Profit College Company, Laureate Education, 
Raises $490 Million in Public Debut, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2017, 11:29 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurengensler/2017/02/01/laureate-education-initial-public-offering/ 
[https://perma.cc/E9MG-QEY5] (reporting big earnings for the first for-profit company to go 
public on February 1, 2017). 
9. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterprise As Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
89, 90 (2015) (noting the benefit corporation has “particular appeal to social entrepreneurs precisely 
because they eschew many of the regulatory constraints of public charities and secure a social mission 
within a single for-profit entity”); see also Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise 
Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 366–70 (2009) (acknowledging the “momentum and legitimacy” 
acquired by the “social enterprise movement” by, among other things, incorporating as a benefit 
corporation); Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social Responsibility?, 
34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1362, 1365–70 (2011) (listing the benefit corporation as one of the new 
legal forms utilized to embrace the idea of social enterprise); Keren G. Raz, Toward an Improved Legal 
Form for Social Enterprise, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 283, 303 (2012) (“[T]he Benefit 
Corporation accommodates the second characteristic of a social enterprise––allowing for 
sophisticated business models that are typically associated with traditional for-profit enterprise.”); 
Reiser, supra note 4, at 591 (“Founders of social enterprises believe profits and social good can be 
produced in tandem and wish to form organizations that will pursue these dual missions.”).  
10. BENEFIT CORP., MODEL BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION 11–20 (2016), 
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20Benefit%20Corp%20Legislation_9_16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/383C-ZKSG] (proposing obligations and standards of conduct directors and 
officers of a benefit corporation should follow).  
11. See, e.g., Reiser, supra note 4, at 598–99 (listing persons who directors must consider, 
including “shareholders, employees of the corporation, subsidiaries and suppliers, ‘customers [to the 
extent they are] beneficiaries of the general or specific public benefit purposes of the benefit 
corporation,’ the community, society, and the local and global environment” (quoting VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(1)(C) (2011))).  
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corporate law.12  However, the effects of these statutes on attorneys 
representing benefit-corporation clients has yet to be explored.  As lawyers 
add these entities to their clientele, interpretation of existing ethical rules 
may change, and new rules and regulatory schemes may be required to 
clarify the ethical duties of attorneys representing benefit corporations.  
It should be anticipated that changes to attorneys’ ethical obligations 
will follow from benefit-corporation legislation.  Corporate law theory and 
legal ethics are necessarily, if not obviously, linked.13  The greater the 
number of stakeholders whose relationships with corporations corporate 
law governs, the broader the universe of people to whom the corporation’s 
attorney owes some obligation.  This relationship is best demonstrated 
through what I call the Unary Model.14  In the Unary Model, both 
corporate fiduciaries and attorneys work for a singular purpose.  A 
corporate fiduciary’s sole concern is that of the corporation’s 
shareholders,15 and the lawyer’s sole concern is that of her client.  If the 
law governing the client organization is inserted—particularly the duties 
 
12. See generally Alina S. Ball, Social Enterprise Governance, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 919 (2016) (arguing 
benefit reporting requirements provide a system that encourages and maintains good social enterprise 
governance, which is lacking in the traditional corporate governance regime); Callison, supra note 4, 
at 85 (asserting benefit corporations are inflexible and, consequently, will discourage the development 
of other benefit corporations and outside investment); William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, 
How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817 
(2012) [hereinafter Clark & Babson] (concluding benefit corporations, in rewriting the business 
purpose of business entities, are developed counter to the established legal framework of a business 
entity); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation 
Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012) (claiming social entrepreneurs are provided with the desired 
flexibility via the traditional legal framework, but recognizing that social enterprise statutes are better 
equipped to tackle the for-profit corporate law concept that focuses on shareholder wealth 
maximization); Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 
25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269 (2013) (arguing benefit corporations, and their resemblance to early 
American corporations, represent a return to early customs); Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The 
Benefit Corporation: An Economic Analysis with Recommendations to Courts, Boards, and Legislatures, 
62 EMORY L.J. 999 (2013) (describing multiple grounds for the development of benefit corporations, 
and noting that this new form of corporate governance creates challenges for the courts). 
13. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Duties to Organizational Clients, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489, 
491 (2016) (“Professional responsibility doctrine depends in important ways on the laws that 
constitute the organizational client.”). 
14. In a unary operation, the calculation involves a single input.  See, e.g., Adrien L. Hess, 
Unary Operations, 67 MATHEMATICS TCHR. 281, 281 (1974) (“For a unary operation only one element 
[often a number] need be given to determine a second element.”). 
15. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (finding 
corporate directors are restrained by the fiduciary duties and standards, including “acting to promote 
the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders”).   
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that the client organization’s constituents owe—the attorney’s ethical 
obligations are the output. 
The Unary Model arises out of two separate but related legal norms––
shareholder primacy in corporate law and the ethical notion of the zealous 
advocate.16  Both shareholder primacy and zealous advocate norms gained 
recognition in legal scholarship,17 caselaw,18 and ethical rules19 in the last 
century.  Under shareholder primacy, corporations operate primarily for 
shareholder interest.20  Directors in a shareholder primacy scheme serve as 
trustees for shareholders, and must act only to further shareholder 
interests.21  In a common formulation of shareholder primacy, “corporate 
purpose” is defined as the pursuit, or even maximization, of profit to the 
 
16. Compare Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors As Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 5–6 (2002) (recognizing most scholars view corporate fiduciaries as agents of shareholders, 
“with fiduciary obligations to maximize shareholder wealth” despite there being a traditional and 
more recent “contractarian” theory to explain the concept of shareholder primacy), with Lawrence J. 
Vilardo & Vincent E. Doyle III, Where Did the Zeal Go?, LITIG., Fall 2011, at 53, 53, 57 (specifying the 
duty of zealous advocacy requires lawyers to devote themselves to doing everything ethically possible 
to obtain the best result for their client, rather than pursuing the greater good, justice, or doing what 
is best for the system).  
17. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 354 (reprt. ed. 1933) [hereinafter THE MODERN CORPORATION] 
(acknowledging the traditional concept that “a corporation ‘belongs’ to its shareholders”).  See generally 
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9–26 (1975) (discussing 
the essential function of the zealous advocate in the legal profession). 
18. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 
(Del. 1986) (concluding directors breach their duty of care to a corporation when they take into 
consideration factors other than the maximization of shareholder profit to their shareholder’s 
detriment); see also eBay, 16 A.3d at 31 (“Delaware courts have guarded against overt risk of 
entrenchment and the less visible, yet more pernicious risk that incumbents acting in subjective good 
faith might nevertheless deprive stockholders of value-maximizing opportunities.”). 
19. See, e.g., CODE OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 15 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1908) (requiring lawyers to 
devote themselves to the interest of their client within the bounds of the law).  See generally Bruce A. 
Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the Ethical Codes and the Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. 
REV. 687, 691 (1991) (arguing ethical rules do not prescribe a clear definition of zealous advocacy). 
20. See THE MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 17, at 354 (indicating controlling parties of a 
corporation operate for the “sole benefit of the security owners” under the traditional concept that 
the corporation belongs to its shareholders).  
21. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 223 (1990) (interpreting 
the court’s holding in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. to mean that managers are trustees that should act only 
to advance the financial interests of its shareholders because doing otherwise would result in the 
embezzlement of shareholder property); THE MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 17, at 354 (“By 
the application of [the shareholder primacy] doctrine, the group in control of a corporation would be 
placed in a position of trusteeship . . . .”). 
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shareholders.22  Delaware has adopted the idea of shareholder primacy as 
the driving motivation behind corporate law.23 
Although the subject of much debate,24 under the ethical model of the 
zealous advocate, an attorney is generally obliged to advocate fiercely for 
his or her client and owes a duty of loyalty to the client alone (within legal 
bounds).25  This formulation of lawyerly duties was not designed for 
transactional attorneys, but, absent specific guidance,26 is applied to the 
professional generally.27 
Shareholder primacy demands that lawyers for corporations act as 
zealous advocates for the corporation’s interests,28 which are heavily 
 
22. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 685 (Mich. 1919) (finding a corporation 
organizes primarily to increase shareholder wealth (emphasis added)); see also Clark & Babson, supra 
note 12, at 825 (“[A] business corporation has as its purpose creating financial gain for its 
shareholders[.]”); Alicia E. Plerhoples, Nonprofit Displacement and the Pursuit of Charity Through Public 
Benefit Corporations, GEO. U. L. CTR., 1, 17 (2016), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2796&context=facpub [https://perma.cc/F5E6-HW3F] (“Delaware 
corporate law espouses shareholder wealth maximization norm as the central corporate purpose.”). 
23. See, e.g., Clark & Babson, supra note 12, at 828 (noting Delaware law forbids directors from 
enforcing a policy that deliberately avoids shareholder maximization because a for-profit corporation 
is required “to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders” (quoting 
eBay, 16 A.3d at 34)).  
24. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 
85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1061–62 (1976) (indicating the concept of the zealous advocate creates a 
misallocation of resources that does not always lead to the greatest good for the largest number of 
people, and that a lawyer’s duty to its client, under such concept, allows strategies that may prejudice 
the opposing party). 
25. See, e.g., Greta Fails, The Boundary Between Zealous Advocacy and Obstruction of Justice After 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 397, 400 n.11 (2012) (“The concept of ‘zealous’ 
advocacy in this context is used more as a rhetorical device to represent the general ethical duties to 
advocate competently, loyally, and diligently in a client’s best interests within the bounds of the 
law.”).  
26. See Thomas B. Mason, Ethics: Conflicts of Interests for Transactional Attorneys, ABA COM. L. 
NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass’n, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2007, at *1 (discussing complaints regarding the 
lack of direction for transactional lawyers from the ethics rules); see also William T. Allen, Corporate 
Governance and a Business Lawyer’s Duty of Independence, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2004) (analyzing 
the negative effects of applying the concept of zealous advocacy—meant for the lawyer in a litigation 
setting—to lawyers in a transactional setting); Stanley Sporkin, Commentary, The Need for Separate 
Codes of Professional Conduct for the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149, 149–50 (1993) 
(arguing ethics codes lack rules directly applicable to lawyers practicing in the corporate sphere and 
other specialties). 
27. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) 
[hereinafter MODEL RULES] (referring to lawyers as representatives, advocates, negotiators, and 
evaluators).  
28. See id. (requiring lawyers to zealously advocate for their client); see also id. r. 1.13 (“A lawyer 
employed or retained by an organization represents the organization . . . .”).  
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intertwined with those of its shareholders.29  If an attorney’s mission in 
counseling clients is to guide the client in furthering its interests, whatever 
duty the attorney owes the corporation must take into account the 
interests of the shareholders––the people for whose interests the 
corporation operates.30  This dynamic also affects the scope of the 
attorney’s advice.  Attorneys for corporations must advise clients with 
shareholder interests in mind.  Concerns for the effects of corporate action 
on the world at large are left to the attorney’s discretion.31  Absent a 
connection to shareholder values, or the identification of a risk to the 
corporation, those concerns would be beyond the scope of the corporate 
fiduciary mandate and, ultimately, the attorney’s ethical mandate.32 
We can also do a thought experiment and imagine a Multiary Model33 
in which corporate law regulates a broader set of relationships than merely 
the one between corporations and their shareholders.  In the Multiary 
Model, corporate fiduciaries must concern themselves with a wide range of 
stakeholders––parties with whom the corporation contracts, employees, 
customers, or the public at large.  Also in the Multiary Model, the attorney 
owes a duty beyond those that he or she owes its client.  In order to 
counsel corporate management in satisfying its responsibility and fulfilling 
the corporation’s lawful obligation towards stakeholders, attorneys must 
represent clients with these other stakeholders in mind.  The attorney will 
ultimately owe a duty, through its corporate client, to the public at large. 
With the benefit corporation, we do not have to imagine the Multiary 
Model––this framework is now a reality for such businesses.  Benefit 
corporation legislation is clear: corporate fiduciaries are to take other 
 
29. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”).  
30. See Simon, supra note 13, at 499 (arguing the corporate interests are made up of “the 
constituent interests incorporated into the corporation’s legal structure”). 
31. See MODEL RULES, supra note 27, at r. 2.1 (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise 
independent professional judgment and render candid advice.  In rendering advice, a lawyer may 
refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, 
that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”).  
32. See Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Kath Hall, Lawyers in the Shadow of the Regulatory State: 
Transnational Governance on Business and Human Rights, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001, 2023–24 (2016) 
(noting lawyers are crafting and modifying methods by which to advise clients regarding human 
rights violations provided they are able to identify some risk to the client). 
33. In mathematics, a multiary or n-ary operation is a calculation involving any number of 
inputs.  See ERIC SCHECHTER, HANDBOOK OF ANALYSIS AND ITS FOUNDATIONS 25 (1997) 
(“When A is a finite set, with n elements, then [the] operation is also called an n-ary operation . . . .  
We may consider it to be a function with n arguments . . . .”). 
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stakeholders, including the public at large, into account when making 
corporate decisions.34  The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation states 
that the board of directors of a benefit corporation “shall consider the 
effects of any action or inaction upon” various constituencies, including 
shareholders, employees, customers, the environment, and “community 
and societal factors.”35  Additionally, directors’ failure to “pursue or create 
general public benefit[,]” or violations of the benefit corporation statute, 
entitles directors, shareholders, or other stakeholders set forth in the 
corporation’s articles of incorporation, to bring a “benefit enforcement 
proceeding” seeking injunctive relief.36 
Does this development in corporate law demand a new way of 
lawyering for benefit corporation clients?  How does an attorney counsel a 
client whose mission is to further the public interest?  To whom does the 
attorney owe a duty?  What is the scope of advice that the attorney should 
give?  The private bar has not grappled with how to lawyer for a corporate 
client while also benefiting the public since before World War II.37  
Robert Gordon of Yale Law School describes the antiquated ideal of the 
“citizen lawyer,” who is tasked in the non-litigation context with “guiding 
the client to comply with the underlying spirit or purpose as well as the 
letter of laws and regulations to desist from unlawful conduct, and if 
needed, to do so with strong advice backed by the threat of withdrawal, 
and in extreme cases, of disclosure.”38  Notions of the lawyer as a 
public-citizen, once embodied in ethical rules,39 were largely replaced by 
the image of the zealous advocate in the second half of the last century.40  
 
34. See Reiser, supra note 4, at 598–99 (listing the various constituents that lawyers for benefit 
corporations may take into consideration when making decisions for the entity). 
35. Compare BENEFIT CORP., supra note 10, at 12, with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2015) 
(requiring directors to balance the pecuniary interest of stakeholders and the public interest). 
36. Compare BENEFIT CORP., supra note 10, at 6, with tit. 8, § 367 (limiting enforcement 
proceeding standing to shareholders that meet ownership thresholds). 
37. See, e.g., CODE OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 32 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908) (advising lawyers to 
act “as a patriotic and loyal citizen” while representing their clients).  
38. Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer––A Brief Informal History of a Myth with Some Basis in 
Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169, 1174 (2009) (citations omitted). 
39. See CODE OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 32 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908) (“But above all a lawyer 
will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as 
an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen.”). 
40. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 38, at 1194 (reporting studies of Chicago corporate lawyers in 
the late eighties and early nineties that showed no trace of the citizen lawyer (first citing ROBERT 
NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW 
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Courts and scholars have considered the questions now facing attorneys 
for public benefit corporations in the context of government lawyering.41  
As a general rule, government lawyers are to represent the public 
interest.42  That said, the rules and body of law surrounding government 
ethics are underdeveloped and details on what it means to represent the 
public interest are scarce.  Government lawyers have been called the 
orphans of the legal profession due to their unique ethical obligations.43  
Often, government lawyers are forced to adapt ethical duties designed for 
the private bar.44  
However, in the case of lawyers representing benefit corporations, the 
private bar may look to incorporate concepts from government lawyering 
into prospective rules for lawyers representing benefit corporations.  
Similar to government lawyers, the profession should explicitly 
acknowledge that attorneys for benefit corporations owe duties that extend 
to the public itself and, therefore, have a higher obligation to represent the 
public interest than do their colleagues.45  In doing so, attorneys for 
 
FIRM 247–59 (1988); and then citing JOHN P. HEINTZ ET AL., THE HOLLOW CORE: PRIVATE 
INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 186–89 (1993))). 
41. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 828 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[G]overnment 
lawyers have responsibilities and obligations different from those facing members of the private bar.  
While the latter are appropriately concerned first and foremost with protecting their 
clients . . . government lawyers have a higher, competing duty to act in the public interest.” (quoting 
In re Special Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 293 (7th Cir. 2007))).  See generally Steven K. Berenson, Public 
Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 
789 (2000) (defending the concept that government lawyers have a role as public interest defenders).  
Some states have passed statutes requiring that the board of directors look to the effects on 
non-shareholder stakeholders, including employees, customers, and the public at large, when making 
corporate decision.  William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 276 (1992) (requiring boards to consider the interests of all “corporate 
‘stakeholders’”).  This may appear to create an analogous situation for attorneys representing these 
corporations; however, the impact of these statutes has been negligible.  See Nathan E. Standley, 
Note, Lessons Learned from the Capitulation of the Constituency Statute, 4 ELON L. REV. 209, 209 (2012) 
(arguing constituency statutes have been largely overlooked).  
42. See, e.g., Berenson, supra note 41, at 792 (noting government lawyers, both in the criminal 
and civil context, are perceived as owing a duty to the public interest). 
43. Allan C. Hutchinson, In the Public Interest: The Responsibilities and Rights of Government Lawyers, 
46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 105, 106 (2008) (“Government lawyers are the orphans of legal ethics.”). 
44. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1033, 1035 (2007) (observing government lawyers tend to be bound by rules designed for private 
sector lawyers). 
45. See, e.g., Berenson, supra note 41, at 794 (noting at least one court in D.C. agrees with the 
view that government lawyers owe a higher duty to the public at large due to their position (first 
quoting Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d 23, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1983); and then quoting Douglas v. 
Donovan, 704 F.2d 1276, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1983))). 
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benefit corporations ought to embrace the role assigned to government 
attorneys—that of gatekeeper.46  As gatekeepers, government attorneys 
use their position “to halt malfeasance by decision[-]makers . . . prevent 
harm to . . . third parties[,]”47 and promote the public interest.48  
However, as with government representation, lawyers may be reluctant 
or unable to define the public interest.49  One way of eliminating a 
lawyer’s need to define what the public interest entails is to clarify the 
obligations of attorneys in specific situations.50  Two areas present the 
potential for clarification as applied to benefit corporations.  First, benefit 
corporation lawyers’ ability to withhold certain information from the 
intended beneficiaries of their corporate clients––in some cases, the public 
itself––may require reexamination.  Might reporting requirements apply to 
lawyers whose clients fail to promote the public interest or take non-
shareholder stakeholders into account?51  Second, ought the scope of 
 
46. See Major Dustin B. Kouba, Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA, 
ARMY LAW., Nov. 2016, at 37 (stating the general view that government lawyers are gatekeepers); see 
also Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The 
Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 997 (1991) (acknowledging there are commentators 
who view the government lawyer as a gatekeeper with the duty to assist the courts); James R. Harvey 
III, Note, Loyalty in Government Litigation: Department of Justice Representation of Agency Clients, 37 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1569, 1600 (1996) (“The courts prefer the public interest model because it empowers 
government attorneys to act as gatekeepers . . . .”).  But see United States v. Wilson, 973 F. Supp. 
1031, 1033 (W.D. Okla. 1997) (“No attorney for the government needs to, or should, act as a 
clearinghouse, a filter, or a gatekeeper with respect to that decision.”).  
47. Government Counsel and Their Obligations, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1411 (2008). 
48. See, e.g., Harvey III, supra note 46, at 1600 (placing a duty on government lawyers to serve 
the public good under the public interest model).  
49. See, e.g., Berenson, supra note 41, at 802–05 (presenting arguments from a multitude of 
commentators who allege that government lawyers have no identifiable norm to understand their 
duty to serve the public interest). 
50. Scholars have argued that:  
[I]t is not necessary for lawyers to be able to identify such a grand, overarching conception of 
the public interest in order for them to serve the public interest in their role as government 
attorneys.  Rather, lawyers only need to be able to identify the public interest in regard to the 
particular legal problems faced by them in their work as government attorneys.  
Id. at 814. 
51. See Morales v. Field, DeGoff, Huppert & MacGowan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 239, 243 
(Ct. App. 1979) (citations omitted) (“It is clear that the attorney for a trustee may be held liable to the 
beneficiary of the trust when he actively participates in a breach of trust.”); see also William H. Simon, 
Whom (Or What) Does the Organization’s Lawyer Represent?: An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L. 
REV. 57, 79 (2003) (“If management is engaging in a clear breach of duty, the lawyer should not be 
permitted to wait for a derivative suit to challenge it before taking responsive action.”).  See generally 
Kennedy Lee, Representing the Fiduciary: To Whom Does the Attorney Owe Duties?, 37 ACTEC L.J. 469, 
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subject matter about which these attorneys advise their clients expand to 
incorporate the effects of corporate decision-making on various 
stakeholders in a way that is divorced from a risk analysis? 
The effects of benefit corporation legislation on legal ethics in 
transactional practice have yet to be explored and, in many ways, remain to 
be seen.  Issues like those mentioned above will require attention.  
Lawyering to this new corporate form may require that attorneys 
representing public benefit corporations practice law much in the same 
way that Gordon described citizen lawyers practicing in a bygone era. 
 
477–85 (2011) (discussing the join-client theory, which allows lawyers to disclose pertinent 
information to beneficiaries of the client, using as an example the representation of a trustee to 
whose beneficiaries the lawyer would owe a duty to); Jessica Wang, Protecting Government Attorney 
Whistleblowers: Why We Need an Exception to Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1063 (2013) (arguing government lawyers need protection from ethics rules requiring them 
to keep information incriminating their client confidential in order to protect the public interest).  
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